When the Montana Supreme Court upheld its restrictions on direct corporate political spending, it showed a real-world understanding of politics and people which had somehow eluded the U.S. Supreme Court in 2010’s disastrous Citizens United. The Montana jurists recognized that corruption is real, and that facts are meaningful and necessary. The opinion put the lie to the legal fiction that money spent to elect or defeat a candidate – but not spent through the candidate, and thus referred to as “independent” spending – cannot lead to corruption.
Democratic governance can be corrupted, and fail to be responsive and accountable to voters, in ways far more invidious than the formalistic, unrealistic quid pro quo corruption that monopolized the attention of the five member majority of the Supreme Court responsible for Citizens United and its consequences. Justice Kennedy wrote that “there is only scant evidence that independent expenditures even ingratiate” and that “ingratiation and access, in any event, are not corruption.” However, he continued that “[i]f elected officials succumb to improper influences from independent expenditures; if they surrender their best judgment; and if they put expediency before principle, then surely there is cause for concern.”
The Montana Supreme Court has recognized that there is plenty of cause for concern. Even a dissenting Montana judge said “I absolutely do not agree that independent expenditures can’t give rise to corruption. Of course it can. Citizens United said the only governmental interest in preventing corruption is preventing quid pro quo corruption. This is simply smoke and mirrors. In the real world of politics the quid pro quo of direct contributions to candidates and indirect expenditures on their behalf is loyalty.”
This decision notes that “the factual record before a court is critical to determining the validity of a governmental provision restricting speech.” One result of the Montana court grounding its decision in facts is that when the court looked at the evidence, it found most of the plaintiffs’ claims of injury unsupported. Though they asserted that their First Amendment rights to political participation were unduly burdened, some of the plaintiffs engaged in robust participation in Montana politics for years. The court also found some of their concerns regarding restrictions on their ability to speak through their corporate persona were not based in the law. The court found that one of the plaintiffs “failed to demonstrate that its speech was impaired by the statute”, and that another‘s speech was “not materially impacted by the statute”.
This is refreshing when compared to the weightless burdens that the Supreme Court has recently found enough to defeat democratically enacted laws. For example, in Arizona Free Enterprise, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they would have spent money, but didn’t because of the ‘burden’ of a threatened response. Additionally, data from political scientists in that case showed an absence of a restrictive effect on speech. Nevertheless, the Court found essentially that the mere assertion that speech might be burdened was a specter sufficient to overthrow campaign finance provisions adopted by the voters of Arizona. Justice Roberts wrote that “[a]s in Davis, we do not need empirical evidence to determine that the law at issue is burdensome.” But wholly speculative First Amendment claims ought not to succeed in defeating democratically enacted laws where the law is supported by sufficient state interests, such as fighting corruption and the appearance of corruption.
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